Certain organizations formed outside New York may not do business in New York until authorized to do so. Called "foreign," whether formed in another state of the United States or in another country, such organizations include for-profit and not-for-profit corporations, limited liability companies, and limited partnerships. See generally, Business Corporation Law §§ 1301 - 1320 (for-profit corporations), Limited Liability Company Law §§ 801 - 809 (limited liability companies), Not-for-Profit Corporation Law §§ 1301 - 1321 (not-for-profit corporations), and Partnership Law § 121-901 - 121-908 (limited partnerships). (For simplicity and for reasons of history, much of this discussion will refer to corporations. In context, such a reference should be taken as including other forms.) The requirement to obtain authority to do business exists to protect domestic organizations from unfair competition and to place domestic and foreign organizations on an equal footing. "Fairness and justice require that when a foreign corporation comes into our State to conduct business under similar methods and to the same degree it does in its own state, or as do our domestic corporations, that such a corporation should be subject to New York laws and regulations as a recompense for the advantages enjoyed by it." William L. Bonnell Co. v. Katz, 23 Misc.2d 1028, 1031, 196 N.Y.S.2d 763, 768 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
Organizations obtain authority to do business in New York by making a filing, an "application for authority," in the Department of State. The effect of an application for authority is twofold: the organization acknowledges that it considers itself to be doing business in the state, and it facilitates legal and administrative proceedings by specifying in the application for authority where and in what manner the organization may be served with process. The application for authority does not subject the foreign organization to any substantive regulation that does not also apply to a foreign organization doing business without authority.The consequence of doing business without authority is that the organization may not affirmatively use New York courts until it obtains authority and pays all arrears in fees, penalties, and taxes.
The ability of a state to require a foreign corporation to apply for authority (or "to take out a license" or "to qualify") traces to Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). It holds that only natural persons are "citizens" within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. U.S. Constitution art. IV, § 2. From this it follows that a state has the power to exclude a foreign corporation from doing intrastate business within its borders. However, no state may exclude or condition admission of a foreign corporation that engages solely in interstate or foreign commerce. The Commerce Clause, U.S. Constitution art. I, § 8, cl. 3, commits to Congress, and impliedly withholds from states, the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. Holding that a corporation engaged in interstate commerce need not comply with a foreign corporation statute, the U.S. Supreme Court said, "A corporation of one state may go into another, without obtaining the leave or license of the latter, for all the legitimate purposes of [interstate] commerce; and any statute of the latter state which obstructs or lays a burden on the exercise of this privilege is void under the commerce clause." Dahnke-Warner Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 290 (1921). See also, International Textbook Company v. Tone, 220 N.Y. 313, 115 N.E. 914 (1917) ("We have steadily upheld the right of foreign corporations, without aid of any license, to engage in activities incidental to commerce between the states." 220 N.Y. at 318.).
Whether an organization is "doing business" sufficient to require it to qualify is often the source of confusion. In part this is because we tend no longer to think about organizations, especially corporations, in the same way as do the historical cases. Another source of confusion is the fact that Business Corporation Law § 1301(b) and its analogs do not define doing business; they contain only a nonexclusive list of what does not constitute doing business. (See the discussion below.) Yet more confusion stems from use of the same term, "doing business," in two other separate, but related, contexts: whether a corporation's activities in a state are sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction and whether a corporation's presence within a state requires it to pay taxes. Before any further discussion of qualification, some discussion of these other uses of the term is worthwhile.
The power of New York courts to subject a foreign corporation to personal jurisdiction because it is "doing business" in the state derives from case law. Courts continue to exercise the power by virtue of Civil Practice Law and Rules § 301. In this sense of the term, "a foreign corporation is amenable to suit in New York courts if it is 'engaged in a continuous and systematic course of "doing business" here as to warrant a finding of its "presence" in this jurisdiction'." Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1967) quoting Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 285, 200 N.E.2d 427, 429, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 436 (1964). See also, Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Services, Inc., 77 N.Y.2d 28, 565 N.E.2d 488, 563 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1990). This test of "doing business" is a simple and pragmatic one, which varies in its application depending on the particular facts of each case. Bryant v. Finnish National Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 432, 208 N.E.2d 439, 441-2, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 629 (1965). See, D. Siegel, New York Practice, §§ 82, 83. A court must be able to say from the facts that the corporation is present "not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity." Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
The traditional test of doing business for purposes of CPLR § 301 is more demanding than that for longarm jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1). CPLR § 302 discards the traditional concept of doing business for a broader standard, that of transacting any business. It also abandons the requirement of the defendant's "presence." However, even CPLR §302 fails to exhaust the full jurisdictional potential permissible under the due process clause of the federal constitution. See Simonson v. International Bank, supra, and Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965). The classic statement of that principle is that for a state to assert jurisdiction the defendant must have "certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316; 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945). A party subjects itself to jurisdiction consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice when it "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denkcla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). Conducting activities without the state that are purposefully directed at the forum state also satisfies the constitutional standard. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). The defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state must be such that he should reasonably anticipate being brought into court there. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 1000 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).
Constitutional limitations on the authority of a state to collect taxes from a foreign business engaged in interstate commerce derive from two sources. The first is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, pertaining the jurisdiction to tax. Wisconsin v. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445, 61 S.Ct. 246, 250, 85 L.Ed. 267 (1940). For a state to validly tax an interstate commercial activity, it must have "some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax." Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-5, 74 S.Ct. 535, 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 744 (1953).
The second source is the Commerce Clause. Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287-9, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 1083-84, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977) outlines the Commerce Clause approach to taxation issues. It sets out a four-pronged standard for determining the validity of a state tax on interstate commercial activity: (1) The taxed activity must have a substantial nexus with the taxing jurisdiction; (2) the tax must be fairly apportioned; (3) the tax must not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) the tax must be fairly related to the services provided by the state. 430 U.S. at 279, 97 S.Ct. at 1079. This analysis, with some modification, is still followed. See, National Geographic v. California Equalization Board, 430 U.S. 551, 97 S.Ct. 1386, 51 L. Ed.2d 631(1977), Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 99 S.Ct. 1813, 60 L.Ed. 336 (1979), Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992), and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 115 S.Ct. 1331, 131 L.Ed.2d 261 (1995). See also, Homier Distributing Co., Inc. v. City of Albany, 90 N.Y.2d 153, ___ N.E. 2d ___, 656 N.Y.S. 2d 223 (1997), Matter of Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 86 N.Y.2d 165, 654 N.E.2d 954, 630 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1995), cert. den. 64 U.S.L.W. 2012, 116 S.Ct. 518, and Ontario Trucking Association v. Department of Taxation and Finance, 168 Misc. 2d 648, 640 N.Y.S. 2d 377 (1996).
Debating whether the jurisdictional doing business test and the taxation doing business test are the same is not necessary nor fruitful here. What is important is that it takes a higher level of contact to invoke the qualification requirement. Invacare Corp. v. John Nageldinger & Son, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), Storwal International, Inc. v. Thom Rock Realty Co., L.P., 784 F. Supp. 1141 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). It follows that if an organization is not doing business that subjects it to jurisdiction or taxation, it is not doing business that requires qualification. Conversely, by qualifying an organization concedes that it is subject to jurisdiction and taxation. Above the jurisdiction and taxation minimum contacts, however, not all business activity engaged in by a foreign organization rises to "doing business" in the qualification sense Von Arx, A.G. v. Breitenstein, 52 A.D.2d 1049, 384 N.Y.S.2d 895 (4th Dept. 1976), aff'd 41 N.Y.2d 958, 363 N.E.2d 582, 394 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1977).
Lending support to the assertion that more is necessary for qualification purposes are the cases that articulate the test as one of corporate continuity of conduct here. Penn Collieries Co. v. McKeever, 183 N.Y. 98, 75 N.E. 955 (1905) (To be "doing business in this State" implies corporate continuity of conduct in that respect. 183 N.Y. at 103), International Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Donner Steel Co., 242 N.Y. 224, 151 N.E. 214 (1926) ("[T]he foreign corporation must do more than make a single contract, engage in an isolated piece of business, or an occasional undertaking; it must maintain and carry on business with some continuity of act and purpose." 242 N.Y. at 230). For the qualification requirement to apply, the local or intrastate contacts with New York must be permanent, continuous, and regular. Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. v. Madia, 717 F.2d 731, 1984 A.M.C. 141, 72 A.L.R. Fed. 562 (2d Cir. 1983) ("New York courts have repeatedly and recently affirmed the vitality of this standard which requires the intrastate activity of a foreign corporation to be permanent, continuous, and regular for it to be doing business in New York. [Citations omitted.]"). See also, Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 95 S.Ct. 260, 42 L.Ed.2d 195 (1974); cf. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 81 S.Ct. 1316, 6 L.Ed.2d 288 (1961). Put another way, "[t]he 'more' that is required for section 1312 of the Business Corporation Law lies not in the quantum but rather in the nature of the business in New York." Paper Manufacturers Co. v. Ris Paper Co., Inc., 86 Misc.2d 95, 98, 381 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963 (Civ. Ct. 1976).
Statute offers little guidance on the nature of the business required for qualification. For example, Business Corporation Law § 103(b) provides, "This chapter applies to commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, and to corporations formed by or under any act of congress, only to the extent permitted under the constitution and laws of the United States." However, as the preceding discussion shows, that is a truism. Beyond that, Business Corporation Law § 1301(b) and its analogs offer only nonexclusive lists of activities that do not constitute doing business. As a class these are activities that have to do with maintaining the organization's status as an entity. Examples include holding meetings of owners or managers, maintaining bank accounts, and defending actions and proceedings.
Most of the law of "doing business" is found in the decisions of courts. Those cases afford no precise measure of the extent of the activities which may be determinative of whether a foreign organization is doing business in New York for purposes of qualification. Each case must be decided on its own facts. William L. Bonnell Co. v. Katz, 23 Misc.2d 1028, 196 N.Y.S.2d 763 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Besides the requirements that activities exhibit local or intrastate character and be permanent, continuous, and regular, a third general factor emerges from those decisions-- the relationship of the activity to the ordinary and regular business of the organization. If the activity is vital and essential to the organization's business, it will have to qualify. If the activity is merely incidental to that business, it will not. Cummer Lumber Co. v. Associated Manufacturers Mutual Fire Insurance Corp., 67 App.Div. 156, 156, 73 N.Y.S. 668, 671 (2d Dept. 1901), aff'd mem. 173 N.Y. 633, 66 N.E. 1106 (1903), Penn Collieries Co. v. McKeever, supra. The court in Invacare Corp. v. John Nageldinger & Sons, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), regarded Parkwood Furniture Co. v. OK Furniture Co., 76 A.D.2d 905, 429 N.Y.S.2d 240 (2d Dept. 1980) and Colonial Mortgage Co. v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association, 57 A.D.2d 1046, 395 N.Y.S.2d 798 (4th Dept. 1977) as examples by which to judge other fact patterns.
This article discussed the general guidelines that inform the cases on doing business in New York for purposes of qualification. For further reading see Note, Foreign Corporations: What Constitutes Doing Business Under New York's Qualification Statute?, 44 Fordham Law Review 1042 (1976) and Annotation, What Constitutes Doing Business Within State for Purposes of State "Closed-Door" Statute Barring Unqualified or Unregistered Foreign Corporation from Local Courts - Modern Cases, 88 A.L.R. 4th 466 (1991).